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The Way to Ereignis as Transformative Event
Transformation / Transformative
Before we understand how Ereignis is transformative event, Kehre is transformative movement, and 
being itself is transformation, we need to say something about the meaning of transformation and the 
transformative in general, since these can mean different things in different contexts. There are three 
aspects to the philosophical idea of transformation that I'll highlight.
(1) Praxis. That transformation refers to a praxis means not just that it is "practical" but that it goes 
beyond being a concept, theory, object of knowledge, etc. It somehow concerns the wholenss of beings 
in their multi-dimensionality. Here we connect various meanings like enactment, actualization, 
realization, as well as aspects of life such as the social, economic, and religious. Transformation is 
inherently something that happens to and with beings in the whole of their being.
(2) Relation. We say a relation is transformative when the two parties in the relation are transformed by
each other. The two archetypes of this relation are the Love and Strife of Empedocles, which explain 
how elements divide and unite to form the cosmic order. These two principles paticipate in the same 
transformational form: each term in the relation both performs and undergoes the transformation that 
takes place.
(3) Nature. Not in the modern scientific sense of material "nature" but more like what we find in Plato's
and Aristotle's φύσις, which can connote εἶδος, ἐνέργεια, ἐντελέχεια and even being itself. In this sense 
it is the μετακόσμησις and μεταβολή that goes across and beyond the static state of things (μετα-
μόρφωσις and trans-formation). Transformation as nature is both the substance and movement that 
constitutes the unity of the transformative relations and practices.
There are certainly other meanings of transformation in other contexts, but these three are the ones I 
find it necessary to focus on when we talk about Heidegger's Seinsfrage and the Ereignis-Kehre-Sein 
triad as transformative. But there is still a potential for misunderstanding, and the most common is, 
implicitly or explicitly, to force transformation to take sides in the subject-object debate. I think we—
not just philosophers but human beings in general, especially in this age of technology—don’t fully 
comprehend the extent to which our concepts are dominated by this dilemma, and for that reason the 
idea of transformation is difficult for us to grasp. For example, I might think that transformation is 
simply when I comprehend some theory well enough that I am able to take it and put it into a practice 
that is both distinct from and not necessarily consequent to the theory. Perhaps I "apply" some 
philosophical or religious maxim to my daily life. But how could I ever get to the point of applying a 
theory if the theory itself and I myself didn't first share the possibility of transformation in our relation 
and nature? The object of theory must already hold the possibility in itself of a crossover into practice, 
and vice versa.
You may recognize that the dilemma here is similar to that raised by Plato in Meno (the "paradox of 
inquiry"). Socrates' solution, to the question of how we can ever search for something without first 
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knowing it and how we can know it without first searching for it, is to refer to a domain of existence in 
which knower and known are no longer in conflict, in his case the soul. Our solution here is similar, 
and the idea of transformation marks out a domain that is unconditioned with respect to the conditions 
of the subject-object dilemma.
In order to deal with this dilemma which wants to convert transformation (and Ereignis) into, either, a 
mere tool or power of the human subject, or, an external mechanism into which humankind is caught 
up, it is necessary to return to Kant, in whom we find the greatest expression of the subjective-objective
worldviews of our age. In particular, Kant's idea of das Unbedingte, and its relation to the Dingen an 
sich and to the Bedingungen of all Bedingten, gives us a way to think transformation as really 
transformative, and thus to distinguish transformation from the transcendental and the transcendent. 
The transformative is an option that Kant himself did not envision but that the Kritik gives us resources 
to think. In short: this should make it clear that with "transformation" I am thinking neither of a power 
of the human subject alone, nor of some entity out there over and against the human.
Transformation is to be thought beyond the transcendental-transcendent distiction.
Within the strict confines of the subject-object antinomy it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to think the 
essence of transformation--unless the transformation is carried out. It is carried out when what was 
previously divided is brought back into the onefold of their transformative nature, and when beings turn
to being-as-transformation and become more than subjects and objects. But the carrying out 
(transformation of and by beings) is not something separate from that into which beings are 
transformed. In one sense the transformation is thus "a priori", but in another sense, and due to the very
nature of transformation, it is only in the carrying out. So it seems that transformation cannot be 
grasped as a structure or fixed essence of beings, since these would imply a being that was not 
transformative at all but only such accidentally through the activity of some unrelated being.
A consequence of transformation-as-being is that being cannot be thought solely on the conceptual 
plane of representation; since on that level of thought being will always be divided up in such a way 
that it is impossible to think its unity (which is the unity of the transformation and the transformed 
being). Transformation doesn't always "make sense" in that it fits immediately into a useable schematic 
and plan from which we can construct an image of it for objectively grasping its essence. That we run 
up against this limit in our discourse and concepts about being-as-transformation, doesn't mean that 
being is not transformation, but that we ourselves in our intellectual capacities, as beings of being, are 
being called on for something more than discourse, namely, transformation. This is why the discussion 
of transformation, and the Seinsfrage in Heidegger, always weaves two threads, the discursive and the 
transformative.
For those who only wanted the basic gist of transformation, I'll stop here and move on. For those that 
would like to dive deeper into this line of thought and see how Kant, Novalis, and Heidegger help us 
develop a philosophical idea of transformation that is equipped to take on the attempt by modern 
science and the information-technological age to convert all beings into subjects and objects for the 
purpose of putting them to use in a program or structure of production, you can see my On the 




It is my opinion that all of the above is packed into the Sein of Heidegger's fundamental ontological 
period, waiting to be unfolded. The proof of this (see also "The Proof of the Kehre in Heidegger's 
Thought") is in what comes next and weaves like a two-corded thread through the rest of his writings. 
Sein is transformative because its nature has all the aspects of transformation: it is a praxis (it is its 
nature to realize an activity and work), it is relational (in that it is the origin and overturning of its 
distinctions), and it is nature itself as the transformative substance and movement that goes across and 
beyond formation while remaining the same. It is due precisely to this belongingness of transformation 
to whatever we call "nature" and "being" that the nature of Sein cannot be a fixed structure or static 
nature but must also have a transformative activity, movement, and relation in its nature. Further, it 
doesn't just possess these latter but it must be these. Being is the source of and reason for the way in 
which beings appear to us to transform.
It follows from this that being is not any old thing that comes along and occasionally gets to work on 
something, but rather being belongs to the transformative activity that unfolds from it. Sein in this 
belongingness to the way in which it occurs (as transformation) is called Seyn, and that to which Seyn 
belongs in its transformative occurrence is Ereignis, or, transformative event. The transformation is not 
something that happens only when beings take up, enter into, and transform their being; it happens too 
when beings undergo the transformation. The possibility that something new and unexpected occurs in 
the world, in nature, and in human beings is rooted in this belonging of transformation to being itself, 
and being to the event of its unfolding.
Das Seyn west als Ereignis.
This says: being-as-transformation occurs according to its nature as transformative event.
This could be shortened and mean the same thing:
Seyn west.
This says: being transforms (with or without distinct direct object).






I do not think that "transformative event" is necessarily always the best translation of Ereignis. The 
language of appropriation is often suitable for the task. That lived experience and being itself are 
appropriative and meaningful has an obvious connection to the fact that they are transformative, but the
latter says more than meaningfulness. I also even grant that Ereignis can be thought of as an existential 
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"structure" at times, and Heidegger himself will sometimes use this word. But what we gain in 
comprehensibility through the existentiel-existential distinction comes at a cost, and the cost is the 
danger of falling away from the unity of the distinction (i.e., away from being-transformation).
There are moments when fundamental ontology breaks down, and it seems that the attempt to "enter 
in" and "take over" appropriation fails. In these cases the language of transformation gets to the heart of
the matter, and this is especially true in the issue of the Kehre.
Two Examples: When the Subject Matter Itself Requires Transformation
There are two main issues in Heidegger's writings that led me to think of Ereignis itself as 
transformative: the ontological difference and the problem of its insufficiency; and the essence of 
modern technology and the problem of Gestell. These issues track through the breadth of his work and 
involve concepts present in all periods, which suggests to me that the "eventful" transformation that 
they both point to is not just a phase or a secondary concern but the consistent subject matter of his 
thought.
1. Ontological Difference
Ontological difference is a key theme of the fundamental ontological texts. It is defined as der 
Unterschied von Sein und Seiendem (GA 24: 454), and it functions as a formula and tool by which the 
themes of the Seinsfrage are always divided up into two aspects: the existentiel and existential, and the 
ontic and ontological. It servers its purpose for Heidegger to put thought onto the path of an 
investigation of being and to distinguish his Sein from the previous formulations in the history of 
philosophy. In this distinguishing, being is supposed to come to light not as a concept or object of 
thought but as existence itself.
But as this ontological difference is used repeatedly toward Heidegger's initial goal of "ontology", i.e., 
"philosophy as science", it tends to turn into a mechanical conceptual process that forgets being, 
converts "being" into just another term alongside "beings", and loses its power to bring the one who 
originally asked the question of being into the experience of wonder that launched SZ. Instead of 
turning one to the light of being (as Heidegger uses Plato's analogy), the ontological difference falls 
away from being and brings the philosopher with it. This possibility of falling away is inherent in the 
transformative nature of the subject matter of fundamental ontology (in der Verwandlung der 
Seinsfrage einbezogen werden die Seinsvergessenheit und Wahrheitszerst-rung, GA 73.1: 113) and in 
general in the relation of the human being to being. It is thus the reason for the Kehre both in 
Heidegger's thought and in being itself.
Heidegger expresses this problem with ontological difference in many places from his middle and late 




This distinction between “ontic and ontological truth” is only a doubling of unconcealment... 
Thus what has been said hitherto only points the direction of an overcoming, but no overcoming
is accomplished [vollzogen].
The ambiguous nature of this distinction: in terms of what has gone before, a step toward 
its overcoming, and yet a fateful link back to it that obstructs every path toward the 
originary “unity” and hence also to the truth of the distinction.
Here the essence of truth is conceived as “forked” in terms of the “distinction” as a fixed 
reference point, instead of the contrary approach of overcoming the “distinction” from out
of the essence of the truth of beyng, or of  first thinking the “distinction” as beyng itself 
and therein the beyings of beyng [das Seyende des Seyns]—no longer as the being of 
beings. (GA 9: 131-134)
It is essential that the differentiation of being and beings come to light expressly as the 
unity of the differentiation. The emergence of this differentiating is sought (GA 73.2: 
1067).
What is required is an overcoming or overturning of ontological difference. But notice that this 
overturning does not now divid Heidegger and the Seinsfrage into two time periods with two 
separate concerns. Rather, it accomplishes just what the ontological difference original 
accomplished--to think being itself beyond its common reduction to thing, object of 
representation, transcendental subjectivity, logic, formal contentless categories, etc. Except that 
now the turning movement of the differentiating event, in which it oscillates between falling 
away from and turning to being, is made explicit. The original Dasein is awoken to this turning 
and "in between" of that which it always was in the ontological difference, and it becomes itself 
this overturning of ontological difference--it becomes Da-Sein.
We might attempt to visualize what "happens" in the overturning of ontological difference like this:
Ontological Difference 1: (being – beings)
Ontological Difference 2: (being – (being – beings))
We see that what happens in Heidegger's transformation of the ontological difference of fundamental 
ontology is that Sein is split into two senses: it is both a term in the distinction (OD1) and the name of 
the emergence, unity, truth, and event of the differentiation (Aufbruch, Einheit, Wahrheit, Ereignis der 
Unterscheidung) (OD2). This operation of splitting up Sein can recurse infinitely, and the Sein of OD2 
could be taken in the sense of OD1, and so on. So we can imagine:
Ontological Difference 3: (being – (being – (being – beings))), and so on…
In this way we would never escape the trap of the recursive division--until, that is, we leap out of the 
chain of the regress and realize that everything after OD1/OD2 is mere formal repetition, while the 
meaning and truth of ontological difference lies in the transformative movement between OD1 and 
OD2. OD2 is the carrying out of the truth of OD1 (die Differenz als der Austrag). OD1 is thus true, but 
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it is not statically so: it entails OD2. Thus the truth of the ontological difference is neither some new 
"difference" nor a rejection of the original difference, but it is the self-activity of the onefold of the 
difference. OD1 and OD2 are not two different differences but only appear so when we tear asunder the
original and only Differenz. Nowhere is this movement of the overturning more clear than in Zum 
Ereignis-Denken (GA 73.2) where Heidegger devotes chapter after chapter to destructuring ontological 
difference through a double gesture that both goes beyond the difference between and affirms the truth 
of the difference (Die Unterscheidung gefasst als übersteigende Unterscheidung), and relates this 
movement to Ereignis (die Frage des Ursprungs der Unterscheidung hinausweist in Ereignis). So the 
two ontological differences here are both the same and distinct in this sense:
"Sein" = ontologische Differenz.
"Sein selbst" = ontologische Differenz als soche (GA 73.2: 1479).
All this that happens, the distinction (Sein) and the overturning of it (Sein selbst/Seyn), is what is called 
Ereignis, and Seyn is the transformation on two levels because being occurs as this Ereignis. Many 
conceptual pairs relate in the same way in Heidegger's thought, because what happens with ontological 











In one sense they are the same, while in another sense they are different. The unity of their sameness 
and difference is called transformation, or being. Heidegger in the fundamental ontological period 
focuses on the distinction, through which one first enters into the Seinsfrage. In the latter writings 
Heidegger focuses on the unity, or the carrying out (Austrag) of the truth of the distinction (die 
Wahrheit der Unterscheidung). From the unity, i.e., from an Ereignis-Denken that corresponds with the 
Kehre, they are the same focus and concern once we grant that Sein/Seyn is transformation and 
Ereignis is transformative event (with the nature of transformation as we have outlined it here).
So we can understand the transformation in the issue of ontological difference thus:
To preserve the truth of the ontological difference
This says: to think its essence as the transformative event [Ereignis] of the distinctions – and 
that as the truth of beyng. This thinking is: to be in correspondence with the turn [Kehre] in the 
"essence" of beyng (GA 73.2: 999).
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And what about die Kehre im "Wesen" des Seyns? This means: the movement by which the things torn 
apart (being and beings) turn to each other in their transformative nature.
2. Gestell and Technology
There are cases where "appropriation" as existential structure works, but in the matter of the Kehre 
we're dealing precisely with the overturning of being as ontology, structure, and ordering of beings. If 
there were no Kehre in Ereignis, we could justifiably say that it is a structure of beings, and there 
would be absolutely no difference between it and the being of beings. There would also be no turn, not 
in Heidegger's thought and not in being, unless we mean "turn" as a rote process and schematization of 
being, a churning of the wheels of a mechanism that keeps beings useful and orderly for a purpose 
external to them. But Heidegger has another name for that phenomenon: Gestell.
Just as the fundamental ontological difference attempts to bring being to light at the cost of breaking its
transformative nature up into terms of a formula, so Ereignis as appropriation as existential structure 
of Dasein becomes indistinguishable from Ge-stell. "Transformative event" has the potential to free 
being from this reduction of its nature to mechanical arrangement and technical know-how, because 
Ereignis has a transformative Kehre that can't be reduced to a mere Vorgang (process, mechanism, 
conversion), and it thus resists the attempt by modern technology to structure the end of humankind. It 
is in this context of Heidegger's identification of Kehre with a turning that allows being to potentially 
transform itself beyond the age of Ge-stell that there is a need to translate Ereignis as "transformative 
event". Ereignis as transformative event names the overturning of being as Ge-stell. None of this 
means that beings don't have structure, that they're structureless material wandering about with no 
direction or constitution; nor that Heidegger himself did not work out the structure of Ereignis. It just 
means that the very idea of being as structure happens to be what Heidegger was attempting to twist 
and turn his way out of with Ereignis.
But without a structure do beings then lose the possibility for meaning? It's in fact the other way around
for Heidegger: meaning is lost in the reduction of their being to a structure. The transformative event 
eventuates the transformation and gives beings their being. This event is always meaningful because it 
is transfromative. Meaning in the information-technological age, which Heidegger only had glimpses 
of but understood well, is given and assured to us by Ge-stell, which places (stellen) all beings to use 
and orders (be-stellen) them into a program for the purpose of technological production (that which 
Die Frage nach der Technik works out at length). But here there is nothing transformative about the 
placement into a "form", as beings are merely converted to technological ends. The meaning of such 
ends is rooted in the essential meaninglessness that characterizes being in the age of Ge-stell, which 
threatens beings with the Nichtung and nihilation of their being as meaningful and transformative. The 
Ge-stell is the schematization of beings in their being that bars the way to a recollection of being as 
transformative and meaningful. Meaning and transformation thus originally go together, but in the age 
in which "meaning" says merely "mine-ing", the one way appropriation of the world to the individual, 
which hides the thoroughgoing conversion of all human activity and thinking to the aimless goals of 
technological production, the thinking of being as transformative event says something more than 
meaningfulness and has the power to awaken beings out of the slumber of the "mine-ing" of meaning 
and their reduction to resources in a pre-arranged calculation of the technological end of humankind.
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The Ge-stell is the conversion of transformation into mere technological conversion, and is thus a 
turning away from being as transformation. It derives from the more originary phenomenon of 
Gestellnis, which itself is a saying of the transformative nature of the Greek μορϕή of φύσις (cf. 
transformation as nature above). Here it is necessary to give a demonstration of Heidegger's derivation 
of Gestellung from the trans-formative nature of φύσις, which he does in Vom Wesen und Begriff der 
Φύσις. But for our current purposes now, it suffices to say that for Heidegger the μορϕή of φύσις does 
not mean a "form" of nature, whether as a particular structure of natural things nor as an arrangement 
and formation of some material--but it is the way in which (1) nature transitions through and places 
itself into the forms and states that, from a schematic perspective, constitute the path of its movement, 
and (2) nature turns into natural things, and vice versa. In short, φύσις is synonymous for the way of 
being called transformation, and Gestellnis turns beings back from its turning away into Ge-stell and 
the reduction of being to schematization into its originary nature as the eventful way in which being 
and beings transform: Ereignis.
Our translation of Heidegger's definition (GA 73.2: 1474) of Ge-stellnis says: the passageway or trans-
ition (Übergang) that brings beings beyond the mere schematization of being (Ge-stell) and into the 
transformative (and thus eigentliche) relation with the transformative event of being (Ereignis).
Whether the transformation can be taken hold of and "entered into" such that beings undergo the turn to
the truth of the difference between Ge-stell and Ge-stellnis, or whether Ge-stell represents the final and 
irreversible transformation of human beings into machines, this is a question that can only be dealt with
from an activity and thinking that lets being as transformation come into its own. And so in one of 
Heidegger's final notes on the topic, in which is contained the clearest expression of the consistent 
subject-matter of his thought, we find:
Die eigentliche Kehre, d.h. die dem Ereignis gehörende:
der Wandel des Ge-Stelles in die Ge-Stellnis
als Vorbotschaft des Ereignisses (GA 73.2: 1479).
We translate this as:
The true turn, i.e., that which belongs to Ereignis:
the transition of the schematization of being into the provenance of schematization
as harbinger of the transformative event.
A Final Note on the Issue
The meaning of being is transformative because being is the transformative nature of beings, and that 
nature is the original self-transformative activity of the "difference" between being and beings. Being 
as transformation explains why Heidegger is able to claim continuity from fundamental ontology to the 
later writings, even while there are clear and often profound contrasts. Fundamental ontology and what 
comes after are concerned with the same subject matter, insofar as we read Heidegger from the 
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transformative perspective of that same subject matter, because being is the same substance in its 
transformative differentiation and occurrence. Thus,
[die] Kehre is not a change in standpoint from Being and Time, but in it the thinking that was 
sought first arrives at the locality of that dimension out of which Being and Time is experienced
(GA 9: 328/250).
Die Kehre is the self-transforming (selbst wandelt sich) movement "in play" in die Sache selbst, and 
this latter is what Heidegger called both the truth of the difference between being and beings (being is 
indeed distinct from beings!) and the going beyond the difference, because being itself distinguishes 
itself as the unity of the mutual carrying out and trans-formative nature of beings-being. Calling this 
Sache transformation and its essential occurrence transformative event is helpful in situations, such as 
the overturning of ontological difference and the Ge-stell of technology, where the language of 
appropriation and existential-ontological structure are insufficient to transform our being beyond the 
decision between subjects and objects that we are forced into by representational and calculative 
thinking. Heidegger's Ereignis-Kehre-Seyn speak to us from a region in which is possible a 
transformative praxis, relation, and nature that resists reduction to both the "mine-ing" and 
objectification of beings.
I am not completely satisfied with "event" as the best noun for Ereignis, and perhaps "transformative 
appropriation" fills in the gap in those situations where it is crucial to highlight the fact that, in 
Ereignis, beings both enter into and undergo being. But that "transformation" and "transformative" 
excel at naming the three-dimensional nature of the transformation at stake in Heidegger's Sein we have
seen above. Certainly it gives us a way to think the unity of both the consistent subject matter of 
Heidegger's thought (Sein/Seyn in its transformative unity/differentiation of being and beings) and the 
problem of the difference between Heidegger's thought and die Sache selbst, which diverge and 
converge with the turning of transformative Ereignis-Denken along the way of the Seinsfrage. Finally, 
the language of a transformation that, in the heart and soul of its idea, brings thought to a region 
beyond the schematization of subjectivity-objectivity, can be of aid to a philosophy that struggles to 
distinguish being in the age of Ge-stell.
– James Osborn
Oct 25, 2017
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